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AbstrACt
This paper questions the view that performance-based 
financing (PBF) in the health sector is an effective, efficient 
and equitable approach to improving the performance 
of health systems in low-income and middle-income 
countries (LMICs). PBF was conceived as an open 
approach adapted to specific country needs, having the 
potential to foster system-wide reforms. However, as with 
many strategies and tools, there is a gap between what 
was planned and what is actually implemented. This paper 
argues that PBF as it is currently implemented in many 
contexts does not satisfy the promises. First, since the 
start of PBF implementation in LMICs, concerns have been 
raised on the basis of empirical evidence from different 
settings and disciplines that indicated the risks, cost and 
perverse effects. However, PBF implementation was rushed 
despite insufficient evidence of its effectiveness. Second, 
there is a lack of domestic ownership of PBF. Considering 
the amounts of time and money it now absorbs, and the 
lack of evidence of effectiveness and efficiency, PBF can 
be characterised as a donor fad. Third, by presenting itself 
as a comprehensive approach that makes it possible to 
address all aspects of the health system in any context, 
PBF monopolises attention and focuses policy dialogue on 
the short-term results of PBF programmes while diverting 
attention and resources from broader processes of change 
and necessary reforms. Too little care is given to system-
wide and long-term effects, so that PBF can actually 
damage health services and systems. This paper ends by 
proposing entry points for alternative approaches.
IntroduCtIon
Ten years after the launch of the Health 
Results Innovation Trust Fund (HRITF), 
which aims to promote performance-based 
financing (PBF) in the health sector in low-in-
come and middle-income countries (LMICs), 
and 6 years after publication of the paper 
‘Performance-based financing: just a donor 
fad or a catalyst towards comprehensive 
health care reform?’,1 in which the authors 
argue that ‘performance-based financing can 
catalyse comprehensive reforms and help 
address structural problems of public health 
services [… and that] it may contribute to 
profoundly transforming the public sectors 
of low-income countries,’ we think it is time 
Key questions
What is already known about this topic?
 ► Evidence regarding performance-based financing 
(PBF) effectiveness is mixed, and there is no 
evidence about its efficiency and equity.
 ► Empirical evidence from different settings and 
disciplines indicates the risks, cost and perverse 
effects of PBF in LMICs.
 ► Despite insufficient supportive evidence, PBF is 
increasingly promoted by donors and implemented.
What are the new findings?
 ► Consultants and international agencies increasingly 
play a brokerage role in PBF dissemination, at the 
expense of domestic initiative and ownership.
 ► Based on our experience in the field in a wide array 
of countries, we have observed that the way PBF 
is actually implemented departs markedly from the 
ideal of an open approach enabling system reforms 
in LMICs.
 ► Too little care is given to system-wide and long-
term effects, so that PBF can actually damage 
health services and systems.
recommendations for policy
 ► We plead in favour of abandoning the indiscriminate 
dissemination of a mainstream PBF model in the 
way it has been implemented so far.
 ► Time, attention and resources should be devoted 
to strengthening key health system components to 
enable them to perform well.
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to question the mainstream view that PBF is an effec-
tive, efficient and equitable approach to improving the 
performance of health systems.
PBF was conceptualised by its promoters—nearly all 
European or American—as an approach enabling health 
system reform in countries where past reforms had 
presumably failed.1–3 However, one can question in the 
first place whether other system-wide reforms, such as 
ambitious decentralisation or human resources reforms: 
(1) have actually failed; (2) have ever received sufficient 
financial support over the years; and (3) have effectively 
provided adequate funding to the operational level—
which could actually be the critical issue to be solved. 
Indeed, for instance, the randomised controlled trial of 
PBF in Cameroon showed that, for most of the positive 
outcomes, there was no statistically significant difference 
between health facilities with the standard PBF package 
and a control group receiving all elements of PBF except 
the direct link between individual facility performance 
and additional financing.4
PBF was conceived as an open approach adapted 
to specific country needs, even in fragile contexts; it 
is framed as ‘a tool for helping create better, more 
inclusive, and more accessible health services’2 and a 
“systems reform approach, which offers an answer to 
the ‘how’ of achieving Universal Health Coverage and 
the Sustainable Development Goals.”3 In theory, the 
approach has the potential to foster system-wide reforms 
in relation to human resources (increased motivation), 
financial management (autonomy of health structures, 
management tools), health information and other 
aspects of governance.1–3 However, as with many poli-
cies, strategies and tools, there is a gap between what 
was planned and what is actually implemented.5 In fact, 
we argue that PBF as it is currently implemented in 
many contexts—under the mainstream, unsustainable, 
donor-funded and donor-driven approach—does not 
satisfy the promises and can actually damage health 
services and systems.
In this analysis paper, we present a critical perspective 
on how PBF is actually implemented. The coauthors 
of this paper are researchers, academics and public 
health experts from Europe, North America and Africa, 
working with recipient governments, in research centres 
and donor organisations, or as individual experts. We all 
share a strong knowledge and field experience and are 
concerned by what we have observed during the imple-
mentation of PBF programmes. Indeed, there is evidence 
that the open, reform-promoting ideal model of PBF is 
often implemented as a rigid blueprint or a ‘travelling’ 
model.6 Mostly financed by donors, implementation is 
often dissociated from existing health system institutions 
and does not foster effective system-wide reforms.7–9 We 
argue that PBF implementation was rushed despite insuf-
ficient evidence of its effectiveness, that there is a lack of 
ownership and that too little care is given to system-wide 
and long-term effects. We end by proposing entry points 
for alternative approaches.
PbF ImPlementAtIon HAs been rusHed
PBF, as currently promoted in LMICs by the HRITF 
and other donors, was mainly designed by academics 
and professionals from wealthier countries as an inno-
vative approach to improve health sector performance, 
without taking stock of the experience gathered by 
similar practices in high-income countries.10 This 
raises concerns, because PBF has not been particularly 
popular in wealthier countries; evidence regarding its 
effectiveness is mixed, and its efficiency could not be 
credibly demonstrated.11–17 Particular caution should 
be taken when introducing a reform in a system as 
complex as the health sector,18 and acting upon some-
thing as multidimensional and changing as actor moti-
vation19 20 which may lead to unforeseen (or negative) 
consequences in the long term. Perverse effects are well 
known from the economics and management literature 
and include gaming, adverse selection, tunnel vision, 
distortion, crowding out of intrinsic motivation and of 
professionalism.19–24
Since the start of PBF implementation in LMICs, 
concerns have been raised on the basis of empirical 
evidence from different settings and disciplines that indi-
cated the risks, cost and perverse effects.25–27 Presented as 
a flagship by PBF promoters, the success story of Rwanda 
was questioned early.28 29 Nearly a decade later, evidence 
is still sparse and mixed:
 ► The jury is still out as to whether there is credible 
and reproducible evidence that PBF is effective.30 A 
recent Cochrane review concluded that ‘the effects of 
provider incentives are uncertain (very low-certainty 
evidence), including […] the effects of pay-for-per-
formance on provider performance, the utilisation of 
services, patient outcomes, or resource use in low-in-
come countries.’31
 ► PBF has been shown to be expensive. In Tanzania, 
PBF economic cost was twice as much as financial 
cost; in a low-income setting, the costs of managing 
the programme and generating and verifying per-
formance data were substantial.32 Under the World 
Bank-promoted PBF model in Benin, for each US$1 
paid to providers, about US$0.50 is used for verifica-
tion, of which 39% goes to the implementing agency 
and 61% to the community-based organisations in 
charge of the community verification; this includes 
only the financial costs—for example, financial trans-
actions that are a result of the verification activities 
introduced by PBF—and does not include economic 
costs, such as the time spent by district health man-
agement teams and implementing agency staff on 
verification, nor capital costs.33 In Burkina Faso, over 
the period 2014–2015, operating costs (in the broad 
sense) amounted to 30% of the total cost of PBF.34 Yet 
there is no evidence that PBF is efficient.35
 ► In Rwanda, PBF has proved not to be equitable.36
 ► Distortions and perverse effects predicted by sever-
al authors10 26 37 38 have emerged in field conditions. 
These include inducing oversupply of unnecessary 
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services, gaming and data manipulation (including 
by controllers), cherry-picking of purchased services 
by PBF agencies, hiding stock-outs of essential med-
icines, respecting norms only during PBF supervi-
sions, inducing work overload, uncertainty and un-
due penalisation of certain health workers, leading to 
dissatisfaction among health staff.8 25 29 39–43
 ► The supposedly motivational effect of PBF on health 
workers may be reversed if the latter perceive it as un-
fair.44 45
 ► The consequences of poorly designed PBF schemes, 
as well as those of suddenly stopping the PBF pro-
gramme (as occurred in Benin, Chad and Mali, for in-
stance), include negative effects on both motivation 
and service delivery.46 47
In 2014, the Independent Evaluation Group of the 
World Bank raised a red flag. It found that multiple PBF 
pilots had failed and that ‘decisions were made to scale 
up regardless of weak, inconclusive, or incomplete pilot 
results.’ It stated that the World Bank had supported 
PBF with insufficient evidence that the approach is 
effective.48 Nevertheless, donors intensified support to 
PBF. Between 2007 and June 2016, the HRITF disbursed 
US$281.7 million, 68% of which was disbursed over 
the last 3 years, when the majority of HRITF-funded 
PBF programmes were initiated (https://www. rbfhealth. 
org/ mission). The number of bilateral and multilat-
eral donors that fund PBF has increased in the past 3 
years. In 2017, the World Bank recognised that ‘[m]ore 
research is needed to assess the effectiveness of [perfor-
mance-based] schemes, and their impact may depend on 
existing conditions.’49
PbF Is A donor-drIven solutIon
The PBF approach was pioneered in very specific contexts 
(postconflict or failed states: Cambodia, Haiti, Rwanda, 
Burundi) by a close circle of consultants and researchers.2 
From small-scale pilot projects, PBF was first scaled up in 
the atypical context of Rwanda. The first reported results 
suggested it was successful,50 although this conclusion 
was later questioned, regarding both effectiveness51 and 
equity.36 From there, PBF was quickly and widely dissem-
inated with intense donor support; the HRITF has so far 
supported 35 PBF programmes in 29 countries (https://
www. rbfhealth. org/ mission). In contrast, with the excep-
tion of Burundi and Rwanda, recipient countries hardly 
devote any domestic funds to PBF.
In no LMIC has PBF been a home-grown strategy; all 
PBF programmes have been initiated and developed 
with donor support. Considering its lack of domestic 
ownership, the amounts of time and money it now 
absorbs and the lack of evidence of effectiveness and 
efficiency, PBF can be characterised as a donor fad. 
Although some fads eventually prove to be long-lasting 
innovations, the prototypical fad is wildly popular but 
short lived, abandoned and readily replaced by new 
schemes.52
How do we explain this donor fad? The ‘results-based 
management agenda’ is tempting for donors,53 especially 
in a climate of global financial recession. Moreover, just 
as was observed with the dissemination of New Public 
Management, ‘[a] new cottage industry of consultants 
has been spawned by this results-oriented […] strategy.’54 
Indeed, consultants and international agencies increas-
ingly play a brokerage role in global health governance, 
and especially in PBF dissemination, at the expense of 
domestic initiative and ownership.55 As Pavignani and 
colleagues56 pointed out, PBF has been disseminated 
from the start in an ‘evangelistic’ way. Currently, two 
closely interlinked networks promote PBF: SINA Health, 
which organised 62 PBF courses (http://www. sina- health. 
com/), and the PBF community of practice (CoP) (ht 
tp:/ /www. healthfinanci ngaf rica . org/). The PBF concep-
tualisers co-opted and trained a growing number of ‘PBF 
champions’, who in turn were sent to neighbouring 
countries to spread PBF. While the CoP was set up to 
encourage open debate, the underlying personal and 
institutional interests allow for little controversy.
As Barnes and colleagues pointed out, the RBF Health 
blog “is revealing in the positive bias attributed to perfor-
mance approaches to health system reform. None of the 
38 blog entries published as of July 2014 were overtly 
critical or specific about potential limitations of PBF. 
[…] challenges were weighed against an extensive list of 
the advantages to PBF in each of these entries and, in 
some cases, stories of successes from PBF flagship coun-
tries […]. Such a positive bias is unsurprising given the 
amount of money the World Bank has invested in these 
programmes as flagships of its Health, Nutrition, and 
Population section and some of the positive gains arising 
from the project. However, the use of PBF-friendly blog-
gers—implementing partner NGOs such as Cordaid, 
World Bank consultants, and representatives from 
‘success story’ country health ministries—and the lack of 
representation of some of the limitations of or potential 
alternatives to PBF—and of those who are more hesitant 
about its transformative power – reinforce the positive 
bias.”55
The enthusiasm emanating from the CoP is not 
supported by solid evidence that PBF is an effective and 
efficient approach, despite the circular argument that its 
adoption by LMICs is an indicator of its success. Many 
professionals seemingly just follow suit because they 
would lose top-ups or opportunities for work or consul-
tancy if they did not adhere to PBF. This may be espe-
cially the case for African researchers, who have fewer 
research grant opportunities and tend to rely a great 
deal on consultancy.57 Even more worryingly, this is also 
the case for researchers in general: publication bias and 
conflicts of interest seem particularly prevalent in rela-
tion to this subject.7 35 Several coauthors of this paper 
have endured moral pressure and even threats for daring 
to express concerns about PBF programmes in countries 
and/or for trying to find out what is actually happening 
during programme implementation.
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Ultimately, money may be the force driving recipient 
countries’ adoption of the PBF agenda, but donors also 
use political pressure and other methods (eg, promises 
of funding and study tours to ‘success story’ countries) to 
persuade countries to ‘buy’ PBF.9 55 58 59 This is especially 
perverse in distressed contexts: ‘as observed in Haiti, 
lack of positive evidence is not enough for a powerless 
[Ministry of Health] to reject a strongly-advocated and 
generously-funded approach.’60
PbF mAy ACtuAlly WeAken HeAltH systems
Based on our experience in the field in a wide array of 
countries including Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Haiti, Mali, 
Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Uganda and Zimbabwe, 
we have observed that the way PBF is actually implemented 
under donor pressure departs markedly from the ideal of 
an open approach enabling system reforms in LMICs. It 
seems many countries adopt PBF because donors have 
convinced ‘PBF champions’ to buy it. Some champions 
do so because they see direct, personal benefits in the 
management of its machinery; in Benin, for instance, the 
acronym FBR—French for PBF—is popularly known as 
‘financements bien ramassés’ (‘easy money’). Beneficiaries 
are not informed and do not entirely understand how 
and why they get certain PBF bonuses.42 61 As a conse-
quence, in many countries, ownership of PBF is limited 
to a very small circle.62 This means, for instance, that the 
ministries in charge of finance and civil service are not 
really involved in its design and evaluation and conse-
quently are unable to promote the necessary compre-
hensive reforms, such as increased financial autonomy 
for health districts and facilities, which supposedly is an 
essential component of the ‘PBF package’.63 PBF is thus 
not integrated into routine health systems processes, but 
instead is subject to separate evaluation missions, budgets 
and data collection tools.8 9 42
By presenting itself as a comprehensive approach that 
makes it possible to address all aspects of the health 
system in any context, PBF monopolises attention and 
focuses policy dialogue on the short-term results of PBF 
programmes while diverting attention and resources from 
broader processes of change and necessary reforms.53 We 
argue that the latter include a wide range of improve-
ments to: working conditions; human resources manage-
ment (disparities in health staff distribution; quality of 
initial and vocational training; low salaries and poor 
accountability; plethora of untrained health staff, as 
in the case of DRC)64; transparency in use of financial 
resources; quality of care; integration of programmes 
and their monitoring and evaluation65; accountability; 
performance of public financial management; engage-
ment of communities (eg, as village health committees, 
traditional leaders and other community members) in 
governing the demand and supply of health services66; 
and so on. Paradoxically, all of these are structural deter-
minants of PBF’s own performance.9 44 66
In all, PBF has huge opportunity costs: millions of 
dollars have been spent on complicated management and 
verification mechanisms that are not fraud proof, without 
producing sustained positive results (even though some 
have been observed) or strengthening health systems in 
any sustainable way.
WHAt Are tHe AlternAtIves?
In addition to individual country impact evaluations 
(see https://www. rbfhealth. org/ impact), the HRITF 
itself is currently being evaluated and is slated for termi-
nation in 2022. HRITF acknowledges that, considering 
the ‘new evidence emerging from Impact Evaluations 
and strong experience on the ground, […it] is a good 
time to re-imagine [P]BF and gear-up for the future’ 
(https://www. rbfhealth. org/ mission- history). Based on 
our field experience and scientific evidence, we plead in 
favour of abandoning the indiscriminate dissemination 
of a mainstream PBF model in the way it has been imple-
mented so far, which does not take into account health 
systems’ complexity and sustainability. Instead, time, 
attention and resources should be devoted to strength-
ening key health system components to enable them to 
perform well. To paraphrase Stephen Kidd on another 
World Bank strategy that is ‘harming many of the world’s 
most vulnerable people’67: Isn’t it time for a rethink? We 
therefore exhort:
 ► Recipient countries: (1) not to believe blindly that 
PBF—under whatever new label might be applied—
can solve problems caused by weaknesses of their 
health systems (see Naudet for a historical perspec-
tive on this)68; (2) to dare to speak of problems they 
encounter with the way PBF is implemented and to 
make donors accountable for their mistakes; and (3) 
to first ensure that the basics are right (see below) 
before buying in to more elaborate mechanisms.
 ► Bilateral and multilateral donors who still have not em-
barked on the PBF approach: (1) to not blindly follow 
the lead of the World Bank and like-minded donors 
in disseminating the mainstream PBF model, and 
(2) to remember that ‘the real driver of change will 
come from national stakeholders such as health work-
ers [and community groups] demanding the right to 
health and pressuring governments to find the mech-
anisms to deliver this goal.’69
 ► Recipient countries and donors: to give greater consid-
eration to foundational, systemic, sustainable and 
country-specific approaches to solving health system 
problems, such as: improved working conditions 
(functioning infrastructure and equipment, and so 
on); wage reforms (raising wages to a decent level 
aligned with position held) and balanced rewards 
and sanction strategies70; human resources manage-
ment to reinforce health staff self-esteem; financial 
premiums and respect for working in remote areas71; 
strengthening dialogue arenas with and supporting 
the initiatives of communities9; use of performance 
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information for local decision-making72; integration 
and strengthening of monitoring and evaluation in-
stitutions and related (local) accountability mech-
anisms65; support to demand-side empowerment9; 
reduction of financial and non-financial barriers to 
healthcare73; development of integrated medical re-
cords; and financial reforms to reduce fragmentation 
of financing for health service providers, to integrate 
their budgeting, cash management and financial 
reporting processes, to ensure fair allocation of re-
sources and to provide sufficient—and sufficiently 
flexible—monies to the operational level.
 ► Independent researchers (since PBF programmes are 
not likely to stop overnight): (1) to continue study-
ing what is happening in the field, while minimising 
the risk of producing biased results74; and (2) to focus 
especially on how stakeholders transform the model 
in practice, how PBF changes their behaviour, and 
on PBF’s complex long-term effects on motivation, 
including the effects of its interruption following do-
nors’ withdrawal.
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